in order to strengthen the British hold-even on their bankrupt sugar colonies in the Caribbean and Indian oceans. Initiatives in colonial religion, education, health, justice, and labor regulation demonstrate a surprising Liberal bent toward government activism in the non-white Empire. Moreover, the self-conscious and energetic manipulation of such a wide range of policy tools reveals a serious Liberal commitment to empire, which further belies the old notion that from 1868-74, "little Englandism" reached its high point.
Victorian Liberals were of two minds about government activism. On the one hand they preached laissez-faire. On the other hand upper class fear of the laboring masses packed into urban industrial squalor prompted much speculation about the bases of order and social peace at home. Tools of repression ranging from professional police forces to prisons and the court system were seen as means to persuade England's poor to inhibit their destruLctive proclivities. However, many Victorians believed that social stability needed extensive rooting beyond simple pain infliction, which taught only negative lessons whose effects were easily lost when the threat of suffering was removed.2 To instill a positive view of civilized conduct required a host of other institutions. Where lower-class family life had failed to civilize, church, school, and employers were to fill the void. Where private efforts proved insufficient, state departures from laissezfaire orthodoxy were justified. Education, religion, family life, disciplined work, and wholesome leisure activities might all be used to tame the brutish multitudes and save society.3 That Victorians often speculated about such potential bulttresses for social peace in no way establishes that they were actually effective. Such thinking was, however, a part of the intellectual environment out of which colonial policy emerged.
As an ideal, much of the underpinning of social stability was to be entrusted to the natural influence of "men of authority, property, and rank" performing their individual and local duties to those dependent on them. In the eyes of Victorian paternalists, men of property with permanent interests in the land, plus personal knowledge of their own dependents, would ensure appropriate management of the deserving poor through justice and mercy and of the undeserving through firmness. Furthermore, they believed that intimate contact between the poor and the powerfuil reinforced a tendency for the dependent and and the State 1822-29," in Social Conitrol, ed. Donajgrodzki, pp. 77-80 and 94-95. Empire and Social Reform 255 weak to identify with and absorb the values of their powerful benefactors, thereby promoting good order.4 This personal "influence" was cheaper and more effective than raw coercion. In matters touching social peace, local grandees were best left to themselves to devise workable solutions.5
However well or ill it may have worked in England, London's non-interfering trust in local paternalism proved disastrous for her racially tense plantatibn societies in the West Indies and Mauritius. Before Jamaica's 1865 Morant Bay Rebellion, Britain followed a hands-off policy with regard to the internal -affairs of these sugar-producing colonies. Prior to 1865 two forns of local government were to be found in Britain's sugar colonies. Colonies such as Trinidad, British Guiana, and Mauritius, which were acquired during the French Revolutionary Wars, were given Crown Colony status with autocratic governors ruling through Crown-appointed councils. Older traditional British colonies such as Jamaica and Barbados were governed similarly to the North American Colonies before 1776 with two-house legislatures-one house Crown-appointed, the other elected by the colonists. With ninety to ninety-five percent non-white populations, property-not race-qualified their tiny electorates. However, over time these narrowly elected legislative bodies had degenerated into corrupt, oppressive, planter-controlled oligarchies. The collapse of world sugar prices, the 1830s emancipation of the slaves, and the adoption of free trade in the 1840s destroyed the economic value of the British West Indies and Mauritius and created massive social problems that, in. good laissez-faire form, the corrupt local assemblies had refused to address. System (New York, 1976), pp. 9-12, 234, 295-96, and 407-08; Roberts, Paternalism, pp. 1-10. 5Johni Vincenit, The Formation of the Liberal Party 1857-68 (Londoln, 1966), pp. 211-14. 6For Victorian reflections oni the problem of West Indian government see Arthur Mills, "Our Colonial Policy," Contem1porary Review 11 (June 1869), and W. J. Gardner, A History of Jamaica From Its Discovery by Christopher Columbus to the Year 1872 (Londoni, 1873; repr., 1971 Given the material ruin of these troubled colonies and the sacrifice of political and economic principles involved in holding them, the question of why they were retained at all naturally suggests itself. Like their seventeenth-and eighteenth-century predecessors, Liberal policy-makers of the 1870s held a high opinion of the strategic value of their sugar colonies in the Caribbean. Blocking American expansion was now the concern rather than checkmating France or Spain. In the Gladstone era, possession of the West Indies provided Britain naval bases from which her interests in any future isthmian canal could be protected. As Lord Kimberley, the Colonial Secretary, explained to Gladstone, "someday when a canal is made from the Atlantic to the Pacific, the W. India Islands will greatly rise in importance. 8 Post-Civil War U.S. efforts to acquire Santo Domingo and the Danish Virgin Islands, and American meddling in the Cuban insurrection provoked renewed British concern for the defence of her own possessions and set the stage for Britain's 1869 efforts to secure French support in matters relating to the future isthmian canal.9 General Ainslie, the British military commander in the area, believed it "more than probable that sooner or later the Americans would be found to be both disagreeable and There was a risk that Suez could fall into hostile foreign hands. Thus, Mauritius, along the alternate Cape route to India and China, seemed to London to be "of equal importance now to that which rendered it of so much interest in former times."12 While many Liberal reformers, humanitarians, and mission societies still carried the abolitionist crusaders' sense of moral obligation to nurture these ex-slave societies toward progress, Thomas Holt, Douglas Lorimer, and Christine Bolt'3 have shown that public support for such idealism had eroded seriously by the late 1860s. It is no surprise then that Liberal British officialdom most often couched discussions about retaining the sugar colonies in the pragmatic language of strategic power. In large measure, it was eighteenth-century conceptions of world power inmperatives that continued to provide the ultimate official rationale for holding these poor outposts in the 1870s. Local initiative had failed in the sugar colonies. Neither white planters nor their black labor force fit the paternalistic mold cast for them in Britain. Rather than producing a united, self-assured elite that sensed its own permanent interest in justice for the lower orders, absentee landlordism in the West Indies left social leadership to a white managerial class more attuned to quick profits and status seeking than to long-lasting social peace. Governor Sir Henry Gregory of Ceylon, who presided over a colony with a tea and coffee-planter class similar in motivation to the West Indian and Mauritian sugar planters, described succinctly the deficiencies generally complained of in colonial planters. Gregory found that even the resident European landlord in Ceylon did not work the land "with the view of permanent occupation or of handing his plantation down to his children," as was typical in Europe. Rather, colonial planters worked the land "to make the most of it, sell it while its reputation remains, and be off' before soil exhaustion made estates worthless.'4 Moreover, Mannoni and 15O. Mannonii, Prospero and Caliban: Thte Psychology of Colonization, trans. Pamela Powesland (New York, 1956), pp. 11, 32, 102-04, 120-26, and 203-04; and A. P. Thornton, Doctrines of Imperialismn (New York, 1965) Despite the fact that government-sponsored social activism in the colonies contradicted the received liberal dogma of laissez-faire, it produced little if any controversy in Gladstone's cabinet. Gladstone himself justified the departlure as necessary to "secure the elevating and civilizing aims of emancipation."'8 The Econ10omist, a joirnal of moderate Liberal thinking, fouind "the one necessity essential to the development" of profitable trade with the non-white Empire was some system tinder which "very large bodies of dark labourers" cotuld be induced to "work willingly under a few European supervisors." "In the absence of slavery," the editorialist argued, "the only possible relation" between whites and blacks must be based upon a "policy of justice to the darker races." Injustice had provoked the bloody clash in Jamaica and threatened to give Britain a negative reputation that wouild make it difficult to get cooperative black labor At home, the Forster Education Act signified the Gladstone cabinet's acceptance of the social, political, and moral need for expanding the limits of the liberal minimalist state in this new direction. In the sugar colonies, the conversion to Crown Colony government after 1865, meant that there, too, London at common lectures and exams, Gordon hoped to produce an amalgamation of the upper classes that would gradually overcome the religious, national, and racial animosities threatening the stability of these communities.48
The push for educational reform in the sugar colonies represented a concerted Liberal effort to establish a firmer basis for social peace and continued British control of these economically bankrupt and racially troubled colonies. Belief in the transforming effects of education even had an impact on colonial road building and land reform, which in part aimed to provide easier lower class access to schools and churches as well as labor markets-all of which were presumed to civilize.49
While education served an imperial purpose, it also held the potential of developing the local talents needed to give colonial subjects some control over their own social, economic, and even political destinies. Without these Crowndictated investments the slide toward social disintegration would have been more rapid, and the available human resources for recovery and renewal would have been far fewer. Crown-dictated education investments were certainly wise.
Moreover, because they held promise for great benefit to colonial peoples, these education reforms were morally commendable by every standard both then and now.
However, a fuller moral and political assessment of the overall wisdom of sugar-colony government activism requires that these dramatic changes in education spending be placed in a wider context. In Jamaica, of a total 1873 budget of ?500,000, the government spent only ?20,000, or four percent, on education. It spent three to four times that amount annually on the importation of coolie labor.50 Aid to the sugar industry through subsidized indentured labor schemes took funding precedence over mass education in colonial budgets. According to Des Voeux the largest number of cases he heard involved breach of contract accuisations against indentured coolie laborers whose "half starved appearance" caused him grave concern. Food and medical services were, Des
Voeux charged, woefully lacking on many plantations, and many of the coolies he jailed for breach of contract were idle due to sickness and premature dismissals from plantation infirmaries. Planter-paid estate physicians were prone to look to the planter's interest in getting maximum work days from each indentured laborer rather than to the laborer's health. Half a world away in Mauritius, protests charged that planters exploited irregular wage payments so as to coerce unwilling reindentures. Similar misuse was alleged in other plantation colonies. The result was high desertion rates, high death rates, and coolie unrest and disturbances.: These abuses made the indenture system "in some respects not far removed from slavery" as Des Voeux saw it.56
Both Gordon and Des Voeuix leveled their most forceftul indictments at the local stipendiary magistrates who passed judgment in vagrancy and breach of contract cases. Gordon found the judicial system in Mauritius biased and hopelessly intertwined with the planting interest. In British Guiana, as Des Voeux saw it, the magistrates tended to be men of humble origins who had acquired an unhealthy awe of the powerful planting classes, whose influence couild make life either miserable or easy for a magistrate. In some instances, estate managers or planters themselves served as magistrates. Thuis, black and Indian coolie laborers stood little chance in court against powerful employers and stringent laborers the impression that the planters would block their access to improved justice in order to "ride them down by the hand of oppression." However, the push for reform soon produced evidence enough that the lower classes now looked upon Crown officials "as more friendly to them than the planting body This, after all, was the practical objective of the policy of "justice to the darker races.
One of the most interesting and surprising expansions of state activity that came in the wake of these investigations was the creation of government health services in the coolie importing colonies. Governor Grant of Jamaica created the model followed in many colonies. Grant placed plantation medical officers on government payroll. This removed the profit motive and brought responsibility for coolie health directly into the government's hands. The reformed Jamaican system also required partial payment of plantation wages in the form of daily food rations.6' Government intervention like this was unprecedented at home.
Even though the Liberals souight to build colonial social peace through fairer systems of justice, they were still quite sure that police and armed forces were also required. British experience in India and Ireland reinforced these conclusions. In the non-white Empire, Arthur Mills was sure that "when our scepter can no longer be supported by our sword, the days of our dominion.. .will be numbered." James Fitzjames Stephen, a member of the Indian Viceroy's Council from 1869-72, compared the British position in India to a bridge over which natives passed from brute violence to peace and industry. One pier supporting that bridge was justice; the other was military power.6
Informed by personal experience in Ireland, Lord Kimberley at the Colonial Office preached repression of crime as "a duty which must be discharged at any cost," even if it risked "violating the constitutional liberties" of subject Mauritiuis, although the colonists had to pay nearly half their cost.75
Imperial troops constituted "signs and symbols" of British control, but local police forces made that authority effective in the day-to-day lives of colonists.
The 1869 Among their duties, reformed, centrally-controlled police forces reached into the lives of the poor to enforce severe colonial vagrancy laws. In Guiana, coolie contract laborers caught without a pass more than two miles from their estate were subject to arrest without warrant. In Trinidad, arrest without warrant threatened any indentured worker "found in or upon any public highway or street, or on any land or house, not being the land or house of his employer" without his employer's signed permission.80
In Mauritius the law required even free, non-indentured Indians to carry a police pass with identifying photograph. Loss of the police pass incurred fines equal to two months' average wages. Failure to obtain a pass made Indians automatically vagrant and subject to imprisonment at hard labor for twenty-eig days on the first conviction and nine months on suibsequent convictions. Still further, the right to work as a free laborer in Mauritius required purchase of a annual license-the cost of which was ?1, or almost two months' pay. Heavy fines, arrest as a vagrant, or confinement until an employer could be found Majesty's subjects in England" who were "liable to be taken up by the police if they are not able to give account of themselves and their means of subsistence." Arthur Hamilton Gordon, a Liberal governor who earned high marks for reforms in Trinidad and Maturitius, found no fault with the stringency of the Mauritian vagrancy laws, but instead objected to the fact that they applied only to coolies and not to the creole and black populations of the island who were "neither less idle, vicious, or lawless, than the Indian."85 Similarly, when a local Chief Juistice ruled that breach of contract couild no longer be treated as a criminal offense in British Guiana, Emigration Commissioner T. W. C. Mturdock showed no rejoicing for the coolies. Instead Murdock fotund the laws "defensible as a matter of local necessity," and lamented the negative effect that employers' loss of these deterrents would have on the colony's prosperity.86
London never challenged these views. Disciplined-even coerced-labor and leisure had their place in the civilizing mission that was part of the Liberals' approach to empire. The argument of "local necessity" satisfied the Colonial Office that, in the main, colonial vagrancy laws should be left alone. The only modifications the Colonial Office urged were for married women unlawfully absenting themselves from work due to pregnancy and child care, in which case imprisonment seemed inhlumane.87
Moreover, women themselves were thought beneficial to promoting social order, becatuse they were believed to have a civilizing effect on male laborers.
In the mid 1860s the Colonial Office forced labor recruiters to increase to at least forty percent the female-to-male ratio in shipments of immigrant coolie labor to the sugar colonies. Throughout the Gladstone era, the Colonial Office upheld this requirement despite pressure for its reduction from colonial agents, the Emigration Commission, and even the Government of India.88 The Colonial
Office held that shortages of coolie women in the sugar colonies increased crime rates, including the "ferocity and frequency of murders." Moreover, "raising the social condition of the people" was more difficuilt where women were few.89
Conversely, greater numbers of women would diminish crime and tend to produce "industrious, well-conducted and peaceable" laborers and "good subjects of India on their retirn to their native country." A secondary hope was that Indian men with families would be more likely to stay in the colonial labor force rather than go back to India at the end of their indenture. Greater numbers of women would thuls reduice immigration expenses and make production more profitable. Both of Gladstone's Colonial Secretaries successfuilly pressed to maintain "as high a proportion of females as possible" in the coolie immigration to British colonies."' Humanitarian grouips stuch as the Anti-Slavery Society condemned the entire indentuired labor system both for its abuse of coolies and for its ill effects on the freed black laboring classes of the sugar colonies. "The sole object and chief effect of coolie immigration," according to the Society, was to depress the wages of black native labor. Especially it objected to financing coolie immigration from general revenuies that were raised through regressive colonial tax structui By falling heavily on the poor, such taxes forced the black man to subsidize his own labor competition.9' Colonial officials recognized that unfair tax structures could exacerbate social conflicts,92 but the Liberals also placed a premium on colonial governments' paying for themselves. The unreformed, pre-1865 West Indian assemblies had created the pattern of subsidized immigrant labor and regressive taxation. By forcing wages down and food prices up they aimed to drive free blacks to plantation work.93 Gladstone's cabinet did not reverse this pattern once the Crown gained effective power. The Colonial Office had no real objections to taxing the poor heavily, so long as the proceeds of the taxation were used to educate, civilize, and "promote their welfare in all ways possible."94 New government investment in schools, roads, sanitation, and medical services more obviously fit this rationale than did subsidized coolie immigration. 93The Times (Londoni), 15 June 1868 and 18 July 1868; Gordon to Gladstone, 3 May 1871, Gladstonte-Gordon Correspondence, ed. Knapluind, p. 46. Gordon was "appalled" at Mauritius' taxatioIn, which fell "almost wholly oni the poor" while the rich were "pretty nearly exempted from to overpower the planting interests, which suspected that education spoiled a man for field work, imperial education initiatives held the promise of promoting social order while multiplying marketable skills and opportunities for the colonial population. If fault is to be found with sugar colony education efforts, it is in the comparatively low proportion of available resources allocated to schools, rather than in the intention behind the investment that was made.
Similarly, the trend toward government take-overs of health services for indentured laborers was of definite potential benefit to the laborer and removed one of the principle causes of criminal breach of contract prosecutions. While the indentured labor system itself was morally objectionable in the extreme, Crown efforts to increase the proportion of women in the flow of indentulred labor were well warranted both from the standpoint of the intrinsic needs of immigrant workers and from the perspective of promoting social peace. Moreover, reformed, centrally-controlled police forces and reformed couirts promised greater fairness in law enforcement and thus held the potential to deter violence and contribute to basic ptiblic order and security.
However, local interests and humanitarian concerns were clearly subordinate.
The preeminence of imperial rather than local interests is best demonstrated inthe retention and further development of the indentured coolie labor system.
The maze of harsh personal restrictions and regulations to which coolie indentured workers continued to be subjected counter-balanced the positive effects of police and court reform and guaranteed periodic riots and disturbances. However inhumane, Whitehall let the oppressive labor codes stand. Stubsidized immigrant labor taxed the poor disproportionately and made a volatile ethnic and racial mix more so. Yet Liberal policy-makers accepted the necessity of indentured labor and never once seem to have questioned its wisdom. Governmentfinanced indentuired labor propped tup the inefficient plantation economies, which London believed it must save if colonial governments were to come close to being self-financing. Saving the plantation offered policymakers hope for keeping these strategic assets with minimum expense to the taxpayers at home.
In this, the black man and the Indian coolie were manipulated to serve world power objectives far beyond their range of understanding. No squeamish "little Englandism" is to be fouind in Liberal policy toward these colonies. Guided by an enduring vision of the strategic value of their bankrupt sugar colonies, Gladstone's first government undertook a host of activist reform programs aimed at consolidating the British hold. In all of this, the "civilizing mission" served the larger imperial puirpose.
